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Unseaworthiness and Personal Injuries Ashore
Frank R. Grundman*
A DMIRALTY IS PROBABLY the one area of the law most foreign to the
ordinary practitioner." 1 Perhaps this is the reason why an admiral-
ty bar has grown up by convention, not by statute nor by rule of court.
Nevertheless, attorneys admitted to practice before the Federal Bar are
Proctors in Admiralty, and a particularly suitable case for the general
practitioner is a personal injury action based upon the doctrine of unsea-
worthiness-a doctrine of absolute liability. This note examines the fun-
damental and dynamic concept of unseaworthiness, and investigates par-
ticularly the geographical limits ashore where such injuries may occur
and yet be actionable. Crew misconduct will not be considered as a factor
in unseaworthiness, as that subject has been treated elsewhere. 2
History
The first authoritative statement which recognized the right to
recover damages for injuries caused by unseaworthiness was Justice
Brown's dictum in The Osceola.3
That the vessel and her owners are ... liable to an indemnity for
injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthy ship,
or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appur-
tenant to the ship.
Prior to 1903, vessel unseaworthiness merely gave to seamen the
right to leave the ship without being deemed a deserter.4 Even after
The Osceola,5 it was generally felt that liability would be limited to cases
where negligence caused the unseaworthiness. The passage of the Jones
Act 6 in 1915 failed to stimulate unseaworthiness actions because it was
generally thought that an election was required between the Jones Act
and the unseaworthiness causes of action. The Jones Act, being a com-
pensation statute where recovery is liberally allowed, produced most of
the cases.
One case instituted before the passage of the Jones Act is signifi-
cant.7 In that case, one Sandanger, assuming that a can contained coal
* B.S., United States Coast Guard Academy; J.D., Cleveland-Marshall Law School;
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Coast Guard.
1 Slaughter, Basic Principles of the Law of Admiralty, 19 Ark. L. Rev. 93 (Summer
1965).
2 Saari, Crew Conduct as Unseaworthiness, 15 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 265 (1966).
3 189 U.S. at 175 (1903).
4 Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 F. Cas. 755 (No. 3930) (D. Pa. 1789).
5 Supra note 3.
6 46 U.S.C. § 688.
7 Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922).
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oil, poured gasoline over a wood fire in a cooking stove and was badly
burned while aboard a motorboat. The case was brought into the State
Court and decided upon the common law doctrine of straight negligence
for the plaintiff. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court the decision was
affirmed, but Justice McReynolds explained that there had been an atro-
cious error below:
... the trial court might have told the jury that without regard to
negligence the vessel was unseaworthy when she left the dock if the
can marked "coal oil" contained gasoline .... s
The landmark case for modern unseaworthiness actions was decided
in 1944, when Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.9 affirmed the notion that
unseaworthiness was entirely unrelated to negligence, and that any negli-
gence of the ships officers or fellow seamen did not relieve the owners
of liability-the owner's duty to provide the seamen a safe place to work
is non-delegable. The suit involved a seaman's claim for injuries which
occurred at sea when a rope, which supported staging upon which he
was working, parted and he fell to the deck. There was a controversy
in the lower federal courts as to whether the rope was negligently
selected by the Mate-in-charge. The rope was unused for two years and
thus decayed. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide the
question of negligence because:
the exercise of due diligence does not relieve the owner of his obli-
gation to the seamen to furnish adequate appliances .... 1o
Justice Stone did not stop there; he went on to say that the ship owner's
duty to furnish a seaworthy ship is absolute, thus foreshadowing an
ominous cloud of liability without fault over all vessels and vessel own-
ers. As will be shown, the cloud spread to cover not only claimants who
were not seamen but more unbelievingly to injuries which occurred on
shore.
The Class Protected
Unknown to the owners or crew of the SS Robin Sherwood a latent
defect existed in a cargo boom support shackle. During a loading oper-
ation, the shackle broke causing a load to drop and injure a longshore-
man working in the ship's hold. The Supreme Court asserted that that
which is absolute is non-delegable. The reasoning was that longshore-
men did work traditionally done by seamen; therefore, they were sub-
jected to the same hazards as seamen. The shipowners cannot delegate
the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel merely by contracting out loading
8 Id. at 259.
9 321 U.S. 96 (1944).




operations to a stevedore company." Control over stevedore operations
is of no moment. In Alaska S. S. Co. Inc. v. Petterson,1 2 under a similar
fact situation, the court found the shipowner would be liable even if the
rigging was brought on board by the longshoremen.
In Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn,13 the doctrine of unseaworthiness
was extended to a carpenter injured while on board the vessel repairing
a shore based grain unloader. A line was drawn, however, when a re-
pairman aboard a vessel to clean a ship's generator met his death by
inhalation of the cleaning fluid. The court asserted that he was a "spe-
cialist" and the type of work done was not that traditionally done by
seamen.
14
It is not unimportant that these quasi-seamen have common law
remedies in the state courts when the injury occurs on land and also
have a compensation remedy against their employer (the stevedore com-
pany) under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act"s for injuries occurring on shipboard. They are not without protec-
tion. Strangely, the Longshoremen Act left the maritime door open to
third party actions against the shipowner based upon unseaworthiness
as indicated. Fortunately, shipowners were granted a right of indemnity
against the stevedore company based upon an implied warranty of work-
manlike service.'6
Subsequently, the doctrine of unseaworthiness was extended to
injuries occurring to quasi-seamen ashore, but the Supreme Court has
yet to draw a definite line as to just how far ashore the cloud of unsea-
worthiness extends.
Shore-Based Injuries-Seamen
A seaman is protected under the Jones Act while ashore assisting
in repair of a gasket on a land pipe used to discharge cargo, because he
is in the course of employment and working with a ship's appurte-
nance.' And, it now appears settled that the Extension of Admiralty
and Maritime Jurisdiction Act' s swept away any defense that the alleged
personal injury occurred on the pier rather than on the ship. The early
cases applied to physical damage done ashore. In a leading case, a vessel
collided with a U.S. owned dike (constructed of pilings attached to the
11 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
12 347 U.S. 396 (1954); rehearing denied, 347 U.S. 994.
13 346 U.S. 406 (1954).
14 Sandy Hook Pilots Association v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959).
15 33 U.S.C. 901 (1927).
16 Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 349 U.S. 901 (1955). A case
with a stormy history.
17 O'Donnel v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943).
18 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1948) [hereinafter referred to as the Extension Act].
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shore) and the court held that Admiralty jurisdiction was proper.19 The
wording of the 1948 Statute is clear enough; Admiralty jurisdiction will
extend to all injuries:
[C]aused by a vessel ... notwithstanding that such damage or
injury be done or consummated on land..20)
Further, it has been said that an essential to jurisdiction in Admiralty
over a tort is that it was committed in relation to navigable waters. 21
The full force and effect of the doctrine of unseaworthiness right-
fully belongs to seamen injured ashore. For example, a chief mate had
his foot run over by gangway rollers when his ship surged; therefore,
there was a question of unseaworthiness because the mooring lines were
not taut.2 2 Unseaworthiness is also in question where the seaman was
not afforded a reasonably safe means of boarding and departing his ves-
sel,23 and where the seaman suffered injury because of an alleged failure
to provide safety equipment (goggles) or require its use,24 or where
a seaman is not properly instructed to wear a life preserver while walk-
ing along a plank covered pipeline from his vessel to shore.25
When dealing with seamen, the courts have also denied liability in
proper cases. In Casselmann v. Tug Captain Kelly, 26 a suit alleging un-
seaworthiness for lack of a tug boarding ladder, a ship's cook jumped
from a barge to the deck of the tug and injured his leg. The court said
he could have stepped from the barge to the upper deck of the tug if he
had waited till the vessel swung alongside, and denied the application of
unseaworthiness.
Similarly, a seaman's claim was denied on the basis that he injured
his ankle while walking along the pier in a dangerous spot. 27 A seaman
injured by a fall from a railroad trestle catwalk while returning from
shore leave was not covered by the doctrine of unseaworthiness because
no evidence was offered connecting the cause to the ship.28 In all of these
cases an element of connecting causation is an evident consideration.
19 U.S. v. Matson Navigation S.S. Co., 201 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1953).
20 Supra note 18.
21 1 A. Knauth, Benedict on Admiralty 127 (6th ed. 1940).
22 Olsen v. Isbrandtsen Co., 209 F. Supp. 6 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).
23 Superior Oil Co. v. Bufford Trahan, 322 F. 2d 234 (5th Cir. 1963).
24 Pearson v. Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 223 P. 2d 669 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
25 Darlington v. National Bulk Carriers Inc., 157 F. 2d, 817 (2nd Cir. 1946).
26 215 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La.), aff'd., 322 F. 2d 820 (1963).
27 Reyes v. M/V Venus II, 257 F. Supp. 335 (D.P.R. 1966).
28 Dangovich v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 235 (S.D. N.Y. 1963), affd. 327





There is an unexplained development in the parallel cases involving
injuries to longshoremen. Assuming the ship was in navigation, the
courts clung tenaciously to the ship's service test to determine liability.29
Beginning in 1959 a New York District Court enlarged and ex-
plained the operation of the Extension Act .3 In this case, a tug made an
unauthorized mooring of a scow to a pier leased by the New York Port
Authority. The scow sank and damaged the pier. The court held that
the Act made a new concurrent remedy in admiralty available for an
already existing action at common law, and made admiralty rather than
common law principles of law and practice applicable to actions com-
menced under the Act.31
A few years later a longshoreman slipped on loose beans spilled on
the dock during unloading and suffered back injuries. He claimed dam-
ages from the shipowner on the theory that the unloaded cargo contain-
ers (bean bags) had holes in them making the vessel unseaworthy. The
Supreme Court denied that there was any distinction between personal
injuries and physical damage where the impact is felt on the shore. Mr.
Justice White said that nothing in the legislative history supports a re-
strictive interpretation of the statute, such as a ship ramming a bridge
or where a ship's winch drops cargo on a longshoreman. Seaworthiness
includes fitness for loading and unloading; seaworthiness arises out of
the maritime relation whether on sea or ashore. 32
The broad extension of the "Bean Case" should be distinguished
from the case where a longshoreman is injured by being swept off a rail-
road car alongside a vessel during loading.33 There the court held that
it was a jury question whether the ship's gear was too short to swing
lumber aboard without a premature lateral movement and that such
inadequacy might be the cause of the accident. Some measure of causa-
tion and physical connection to the vessel's gear were present. The "Bean
Case" shocked vessel owners and left them wondering just where it
would all end. Herbert J. Baer described the effect of the decision in
this manner:
Whether one agrees with the Court or with Justice Harlan, it must
be conceded that Gutierrez is a substantial stride forward in the
development of a policy which makes the shipowner an insurer for
29 Annot., 84 A.L.R. 2d 620 (1962); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, supra note 11;
Crumady v. Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
30 Supra note 18.
31 Petition of N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 172 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
32 Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963). It is important to note the
complete lack of physical connection between the vessel and the beans once they had
been spilled on the dock.
33 Brown v. Westfal-Larsen & Co., 383 P. 2d 1003 (S. Ct. Ore. 1963).
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all injuries sustained by longshoremen engaged in servicing the
vessel.3
4
A short time later, a circuit court was presented with a controversy
involving a longshoreman injured while engaged in the movement of
freight cars propelled by a ship's line to position the cars for loading.35
In sustaining recovery for the longshoreman, the court unnecessarily re-
lied on the "Bean Case."
The Third Circuit was called upon in 1965 to define the physical
limit of the unseaworthiness cloud over the shore. It did not.36 A bulk
cargo of nitrate of soda was being discharged using a shore-based crane.
The crane bucket lifted the powdery substance from the ship's hold,
swung around, and dropped it into a large shore-based hopper. (Funnel
shaped containers that trucks drove beneath for loading.) Neither hop-
per nor crane were in any way attached to the vessel. The claimant was
injured by a premature movement of the hopper door release handle
which he was assigned to operate. It was held that the hopper had suffi-
cient connection with the ship to be within the subject matter of the war-
ranty of seaworthiness, reasoning that the doctrine would have applied
while the crane reached in the ship's hold and removed cargo and such
removal having a beginning must have an end. Further, it was said that
unseaworthiness is not to be rigidly construed so as to exclude modern
labor saving methods used to do the work traditionally done by seamen.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari. As in the "Bean Case," here
again there was a complete absence of direct causation or physical con-
nection with the ship's appurtenances.
An earlier case37 demonstrates how courts over-emphasize the ship's
service test of applicability of unseaworthiness. A dockside line handler
was injured by a parted mooring line and denied recovery because he
was not doing work traditionally done by seamen. (Note that the same
reasoning could not be applied to Great Lakes ore vessels, because their
lines have traditionally been handled by the ship's crew.) Here we have
a person intimately involved in an essential and ordinary seamanship
operation, who was directly injured by a ship's appliance which may
have even been patently defective, and he is denied the application of
unseaworthiness.
The results in the "Bean" and "Hopper" cases are far reaching,
when considered in the light of other recent decisions defining how un-
seaworthiness can arise. In 1960, it was held that "transitory conditions"
can result in an unseaworthy vessel. Due diligence of the shipowner
34 Baer, Admiralty Law of the Supreme Court 48 (1967 Cumulative Supplement).
35 Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F. 2d 657 (3rd Cir. 1964).
36 Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F. 2d 204 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965).




does not relieve him of his obligation under the doctrine. 38 The facts of
this case reveal that a fisherman, slipping on a ship's rail covered with
fish slime, can recover against the shipowner even though he was in-
volved in the unloading operation which produced the "unseaworthy
condition," regardless of the owners notice or ability to correct the situ-
ation. In a more recent case,39 the Supreme Court held a ship could be
made unseaworthy by the assignment of two men to do the work of three
or four. A ship's mate assigned two seamen to haul an 8-inch mooring
line across the deck; one man injured his back, and expert testimony
showed three or four men should have been used.
The Issue
Should the rules established under the unseaworthiness doctrine
and carried ashore by the Extension Act, be applied identically to sea-
men and to all those who do the work traditionally done by seamen?
I think not. Should a hypothetical longshoreman slipping on the pier on
a banana peel discarded minutes before by a fellow longshoreman during
their lunch hour, recover against the shipowner upon the rationale that
longshoremen, like seamen, must eat and that therefore there is sufficient
connection with the unloading operation to invoke the doctrine of un-
seaworthiness? Could it be argued that the unloading of a vessel only
ceases when the job is complete, when the hatch covers are once more
in place? Should a hypothetical harbor worker assigned by his steve-
dore boss to haul an 8" rigging line for a shore based crane be able to
recover against the shipowner if he injures his back while hauling the
line? Such results are absurd, and merely add to a multiplicity of suits
already existing; such cases would not be just.
It is suggested that the courts are permitting recovery whenever
and wherever a person is found doing the work traditionally done by
seamen. By so doing they can never define the physical extent of the
cloud of unseaworthiness. If one of the purposes of our judicial system
of stare decisis is to inject an element of certainty in similar fact situa-
tions, then the courts are remiss in not defining the physical limits of
unseaworthiness claims by quasi-seamen.
A Conflict
The Circuit Courts are not in agreement as to whether shore con-
nected injuries are within the scope of unseaworthiness. In McKnight v.
N. M. Patterson & Son Ltd.,40 the court affirmed a motion for summary
judgment for the defendant shipowner. It was held that even a long-
38 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
39 Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 385 U.S. 810 (1967).
40 286 F. 2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961).
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shoreman injured in the ship's hold by a shore based crane did not render
the vessel unseaworthy because the crane was under the control of an
independent contractor and it never became physically attached to the
ship. In Huff v. Matson Navigation Co.41 the exact opposite result was
reached when a longshoreman in a ship's hold was injured by the "sugar
scraper" of a shore based crane. Similarly, Metzger v. Torm42 held that
a defective cargo sling at the end of a shore based crane could render
a vessel unseaworthy. The sling broke and caused the death of a long-
shoreman because the sling was deemed an appurtenance of the ship.
The court distinguished between the facts in a Second Circuit decision43
where a "jury rig" sling was used by a foreman to hoist a baggage con-
veyor to a vessel's sideport. In the latter decision, the rig broke while
being hoisted by a shore based crane; the claimant was riding the con-
veyor at the time so he fell to the dock and injured his leg. The court
held the vessel's appurtenances were not unseaworthy and his shore
based injury was not within the scope of the doctrine. And in Deffes v.
Federal Barge Lines Inc.,44 the Fifth Circuit held that a defective marine
leg inserted into a vessel's hold to unload a bulk cargo would render the
vessel unseaworthy. In essence, only Spann45 and Forkin46 are in direct
conflict because each involves an injury ashore caused by shore based
machinery. It remains for the Supreme Court to speak upon the matter.
The denial of Petition for Certiorari in the Spann case is not sufficient.
Conclusions
It is a well established rule of admiralty that a shipowner is liable
to indemnify a seaman for an injury caused by unseaworthiness of the
vessel or its equipment. The shipowner has an absolute non-delegable
duty of care to provide a safe atmosphere about his vessel. The notable
prerequisites to recovery are that (1) the vessel is in navigation47 (not
laid up or dismantled) and (2) the plaintiff is in the class protected 48
(doing the work traditionally done by seamen).
41 338 F. 2d 205 (9th Cir. 1964).
42 245 F. Supp. 227 (D. Md. 1965).
43 Forkin v. Furness Withy & Co., 323 F. 2d 638 (2d Cir. 1963).
44 361 F. 2d 422 (5th Cir. 1966), rev'g 229 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. La. 1964). See also,
Cockrell v. A. L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Tex. 1961);
Miller v. The Transandina, 1964 A.M.C. 1159 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Litwinowicz v. Weyer-
haeuser S.S. Co., 179 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (ship's gear gave way injuring
longshoreman working in R.R. car on pier); Manson v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 229
F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (plaintiff on pier fell on slippery steel plate deemed to
be an appurtenance because it had been used on ship).
45 Supra note 36.
46 Supra note 43.
47 Roper v. United States, 368 U.S. 20 (1961).
48 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, supra note 11; Sandy Hook Pilots Association v.




Thus the geographical limits of the cloud of unseaworthiness remain
elusive and undefined. There should, however, be a caveat where the
cause of the injury emanates ashore. In such cases, the application of
absolute liability should not be charged until a substantial causal con-
nection is found. Under the Extension Act,49 there is at least an impli-
cation that the injury-producing cause commenced aboard the vessel and
was merely "consummated" ashore. Surely, the injury to a longshore-
man must, in some way, have been caused by some type of unseaworthi-
ness.
Circuit Justice Forman used similar reasoning in Hagans v. Eller-
man & Bucknall S.S. Co.
50
A stevedore company was engaged to unload a cargo of sand bags
in a vessel's hold. Slings were lowered into the hold and loaded with
bags of sand; winches elevated the full slings out of the hold and depos-
ited them on a flattruck. The truck was then towed into a warehouse
on the pier where the sand was unloaded by a gang of longshoremen.
Hagans was in the act of grasping a bag to unload the truck when his
foot slipped on sand on the floor causing his body to twist resulting in
an injury to his back. The court dismissed the contention that maritime
jurisdiction did not attach because of the situs of the alleged tort. It was
made clear, however, that jury questions were presented as to (1)
whether the vessel was rendered unseaworthy by the broken cargo con-
tainers (sand bags) which caused the loose sand in the warehouse, and
(2) whether such unseaworthiness was the cause of the injury to the
longshoreman.
The rule that Admiralty extends to those doing work traditionally
done by seamen must only be used to determine the applicability of
maritime law and not determinative of the issue of unseaworthiness,
especially when considering shore based personal injuries.
Post Script
"The perils of the sea, which mariners suffer and shipowners insure
against, have met their match in the perils of judicial review." 5'
49 Supra note 18.
50 318 F. 2d 563 (3rd Cir. 1963).
51 Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty 248 (1957).
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